PHA-Exchange> New Dialogue on Democracy-Governance-Human Rights in VN

[David Lempert]

Below is the executive summary of a report commissioned by the British Department for International Development (DFID) as part of a 10-country study to reassess the role of the European Union/ European Commission in democracy, governance and human rights in its development portfolio.  This report focuses on Vietnam and was approved by One World Action, an organization tasked by DFID to conduct the research.

The report is different from other work on democracy-governance and human rights:
-- It attempts to build a bridge and to break through impasses in the dialogue on these issues from both sides by focusing on sustainable development as a shared concern to developing and developed countries, rather than a difference of moral, legal or political values;
-- It looks at the issue in terms of historical legacy of colonial relations and what that means on both sides for understanding what is needed to improve the current dialogue;
-- It focuses on democracy, governance and human rights as economic issues in sustainable development that can be measured, with discussion of ways to measure costs and benefits and to integrate these into development planning, rather than viewing these as separate issues of culture or politics.

If you would like a copy of the full report, I would be happy to send it in either (or both) of two versions (pdf and Word file) and with an appendix with textbook type explanations of the issues and measures that can be applied.  The word file report format directly references the appendix, but the pdf file doesn't.

It is the hope of this report that it will lead to constructive changes and progress that is beneficial to all sides and a rethinking of development policy in this area.

For more information, contact:
David Lempert, Ph.D., J.D., M.B.A. at the address of this e-mail or  superlemp at yahoo.com

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Executive summary:  (Note that the summary is geared more directly to the European Union/European Commission, but the report itself has many more sections of general interest in democracy-governance-human rights measures (for economic development), ways of thinking, and means of bridging the gaps between international development actors and Viet Nam in thinking and reaching consensus on these issues.) 

HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY FINDINGS

 

* The EC has done little to distinguish itself in its role in Vietnam because it is acting like any State actor, and more like a "super-State" with a 19th century vision of politics, aggregating individual State interests and pursuing the short-term economic interests of its members.  Its real mission should be different from that of the European Member States, in a role to (really, as the ONLY organisation that can) look out for the long-term interests of the international system as a whole.  The EC in Vietnam should not merely have the same role as other development agencies and follow their (mostly short-term trade-oriented agendas) in the areas of democracy-governance-human rights (and sustainability), merely to "coordinate with them."  The EC has a completely different, complementary, set of roles, responsibilities and potential in this area that it is not even starting to fulfill.  (Part 1)

 

The EC is the perfect actor (and possibly the ONLY actor) that can look out for the long-term interests of the world's weaker and developing states (and the cultures and peoples within them), while also looking out for the long-term interests of European countries and the globe.  

 

The EC may be the only actor that can gain the credibility to do so in countries like Vietnam that, as a result of colonialism, do not trust the intentions of the former colonial powers (not only the U.S. and Europe, but also China) to defend their interests now any better than they have in the past, and view d-g-hr reforms with suspicion.  Though Europe may see itself as having overcome a legacy of nationalism and colonial conflicts, that is not what a country like Vietnam sees in the relations that European countries or the EC seek to create with it, as a former colony.

 

* The EC's current choice in its strategy, to set trade and global harmonization as an ends equal to, or higher than sustainable growth, and d-g-hr as a means to promote trade and globalization rather than as a key to economic sustainability, will potentially destabilize the international system and undermine long-term sustainable growth, against the interests of Europe and the countries in which it has development programmes.  (Part 2) Placing the EC's trade agenda on an equal footing with traditional aid suggests to the Vietnamese that it is using aid as a way to buy trade and that the EC does not recognize any shared long-term interests with Vietnamese people, Vietnamese cultures, or the Vietnamese government, other than short-term economic gain.  In neglecting d-g-hr in its strategy and making it a component of trade rather than a means to economic sustainability of diverse cultures including that of rural Vietnam and of Vietnam's minorities, the EC in Vietnam not only has done little to promote sustainability and d-g-hr in Vietnam, but may actually have contributed to problems it has attempted to solve. (Part 3)

 

In living up to its international role, the EC Vietnam delegation needs to define its mission as the long-term sustainability of the different cultures of Vietnam, including rural Vietnamese Kinh (majority) culture, as the ends of EC support, with d-g-hr programmes as a key means to that ends.  Trade and global integration need to be recognized only as a possible means to that end, that should be both "appropriate" to Vietnam's cultures and "fair", but not an end in itself.

 

*  Neither in setting its development agenda, nor in its political "dialogues" with Vietnamese government officials, nor in required "mainstreaming" of d-g-hr concerns into its development projects, nor even as a basic screening criteria, does the EC offer any indicators or economic measures of d-g-hr that would make them a routine and essential, and objective and professional, component of sustainable development.   The EC has the funds and stated intent but has not demonstrated, through its actions, commitment to establish and use a set of objective d-g-hr benchmarks for all of the world's countries as part of a set of human development indicators to supplement and challenge those currently used by other international institutions, and that tie d-g-hr concerns to economic sustainability.  Sample indicators such as:  endangerment and threats to cultures (a cultural diversity measure); international corruption measures and losses; national resource accounting measures that evaluate threats to a country's resources that compromise the rights of future generations, social equality measures, political freedom measures, and cultural sustainability projections not only are not used but are outside of the basic vocabulary of the EC.  (Part 3)

 

*  The EC delegation has a special and comparative advantage over other international development actors in post-colonial transformations of formerly dependent (largely European colonial) regimes that have inherited a legacy of colonial institutions and ways of thinking, and in creating global security in ways that promote the de-militarization of countries that (whether rationally or not) continually fear external and internal threats.  If it were to recognize these advantages and incorporate them into "dialogues" with the Vietnamese government and into routine development activities, it would have a major impact on d-g-hr and on sustainable growth.  Yet, the EC's structure as an "Embassy" protecting "European interests" frames its interaction with Vietnam as competitive and adversarial rather than as open and constructive towards global human interests.  (Parts 2 and 4)

 

The delegation feels that it must maintain a "line" in which Europe does not openly discuss or apologize for any errors of the colonial period or openly praise those aspects of Vietnamese and Asian religions and ideology that show a concern for d-g-hr, or recognize any of the European aspirations of rights and ideals in Vietnam's revolutionary movements or in its "communist" and "socialist" goals (though these are often rooted in European ideals of social and communal justice).  The ideal of placing Europe first and above Asia distorts any shared understanding of progressive aspects of Vietnamese and Asian culture and of Vietnam's real sensitivities and fears, and paralyzes rather than advances reforms.  

 

*  The staff of the EC Delegation has no specialists in the many areas that comprise d-g-hr, sustainable development, nor understanding of the peoples and cultures of Vietnam.  Even if policies were to change, the current staff might not be able to carry them out without the hiring of other professionals or the inclusion of or retraining in approaches that have been neglected  Much of the staff sees itself in the role of functionaries or diplomats, implementing decisions from above that are the result of political compromise and for which they bear no responsibility.  They largely see themselves serving the interest of European politicians, other international organizations' agendas, and Vietnamese government officials rather than the Vietnamese people, European citizens, long-term global interests, or even that of professionalism of their disciplines.  Staff say that they have not been tasked to promote long-term global interests or the interests of Vietnamese cultures first, and this is why they say they fall back on short-term interests and ideologies of Europe or the bureaucratic interests of the delegation.  (Part 5)

 

*  Institutional procedures at the EC do not assure compliance or transparency in ways that would model democracy and good governance for Vietnam or that would incorporate and effectively implement and mainstream stated policies to d-g-hr.  Staff of the EC are not held accountable to their own stated missions and operate inside a bureaucratic structure in which goals and responsibilities are left unclear, goals are competing, and there is no allocation of commitment to beneficiaries versus constituents. (Part 4)

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