PHA-Exchange> COMMERCIAL POULTRY AND ITS LINKS TO BIRD FLU

[Claudio]

From:  idrismd at tm.net.my 
 
CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION OF PENANG (CAP)

NO. 10, JALAN MASJID NEGERI, 11600 PULAU PINANG, MALAYSIA

 


      ALERT 

      FOR INFORMATION / POSSIBLE ACTION 
     

 

 24 March 2006

 

 COMMERCIAL POULTRY AND ITS LINKS TO BIRD FLU





Migratory birds were believed to be the cause of the spread of the disease.

 

The slaughter of poultry in all wet markets will be banned as a precautionary measure to prevent the bird flu virus from spreading to humans. This will mean squeezing out the small producers in favour of the commercial poultry sector.

 This assumes that bird flu is a problem of wild birds and backyard poultry practices not modern poultry farming.

 

The emphasis on backyard poultry and the wild bird theory ignores the role of the commercial poultry industry in the spread of the H5N1 virus.



According to a recent report published by GRAIN (an international organization dealing with agricultural issues), the root of the problem is the poultry industry and this must be the focus of efforts to control the deadly H5N1 virus.

 

Citing bird conservationists, wild birds are victims not vectors of highly pathogenic (disease causing) avian influenza. Highly pathogenic strains of bird flu develop in poultry, most likely poultry exposed to milder strains that live naturally in wild bird populations.



In crowded poultry operations, the wild virus evolves rapidly towards more pathogenic and highly transmissible forms capable of jumping species and spreading back into wild birds that are defenseless against the new strain. In this sense H5N1 is a poultry virus killing wild birds, not the other way around.

 

Similarly, bird flu does not evolve to highly pathogenic forms in backyard poultry, where low density and genetic diversity keep the viral load to low levels. Backyard poultry are the victims of bird flu strains brought in from elsewhere.

 

When backyard poultry farms are separated from the source of highly pathogenic bird flu, the virus seems to die out or evolve towards a less pathogenic form.

 

Migratory birds and backyard chickens are not effective vectors of highly pathogenic bird flu. The virus kills them, but is unlikely to be spread by them.



In Laos, which is surrounded by infected countries, the H5N1 outbreaks have occurred in the nation's few factory farms, which are supplied by Thai hatcheries. The only cases of bird flu in backyard poultry, which account for over 90 percent of Laos' production, occurred next to the factory farms. 

 

According to the report, 'the evidence we see over and over again from the Netherlands in 2003 to Japan in 2004 to Egypt in 2006 is that lethal flu breaks out in large scale industrial chicken farms and then spreads'.



In Nigeria, the outbreaks earlier this year began at a single factory farm, owned by a Cabinet Minister, distant from hotspots for migratory birds but known for importing unregulated hatchable eggs.



In India, local authorities say that H5N1 emerged and spread from a factory farm owned by the nation's largest poultry company Venkateshwara Hatcheries.

 

As recently as November 2005, FAO has stated that 'To date, extensive testing of clinically normal migratory birds in the infected countries has not produced any positive results for H5N1 so far'.



In fact, nearly all the wild birds that have tested positive for the disease were dead and, in most cases, found near to outbreaks in domestic poultry.

 

According to Juan Lubroth, a senior officer with FAO 'It is very easy to blame wild birds and the migration of birds because nobody is responsible. It is possible that wild birds may introduce the virus, but it is through human activities of commerce and trade that the disease spreads'.



WHO states that a possible medium for the spread of bird flu is chicken feed. One of the standard ingredients in industrial chicken feed is 'poultry litter' which includes faecal matter, feathers, bedding as well as chicken meat. Bird flu can survive in bird faeces for up to 35 days. Yet nothing is being done to tighten regulations or monitoring of the feed industry.



The poultry industry that has swept Asia in recent decades has produced rapid genetic erosion. Local production systems were displaced by integrated systems that rely on a single source of parental stock and small farms were encouraged to give up local breeds for high yielding breeds that are often not suited to local conditions.



According to the Chief of the Animal Production Service of the FAO, 'Developing animal genetic resources on farm in their production environment is the most effective approach to maintain genetic diversity . and provide insurance against future threats such as famine, drought, and epidemics'. And there are reports from the World Organisation of Animal Health of local chickens surviving the H5N1 virus.



GRAIN cautions that 'The strategy to contain H5N1 by destroying the genetically diverse backyard flocks and developing even more intensive poultry operations will perversely increase the . likelihood of a human transmissible version of lethal bird flu emerging from the large scale factory farms'.



Instead, immediate measures should be initiated to monitor and regulate the poultry and the egg trade. Urgent efforts should be geared towards investigating how factory farms and their by-products such as animal feed and manure spread the lethal virus. 

 

 

      CAP would like to make the following recommendations which your organization may like to consider for action:

       

      ·        Share the above information in your country either using press releases or letters to the Government. If your country practices factory farming for poultry, call for investigations and monitoring. 

      ·        Forward this Alert to other organizations in your country.

      ·        Write letters to WHO and FAO calling for investigations based on the above information. 

       
     



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