PHA-Exchange> WTO: Special and Differential Treatment

[David Legge]

Dear friends,

Participation in productive and fair trade is the most important pathway to
development for poor countries.

Unfortunately the current global regime for regulating trade is heavily
stacked against the poor countries.  The failure of the Cancun Ministerial
to address agricultural protection by the rich countries while in all other
fields the poor countries are being forced to radically liberalise
symbolises the structured unfairness of global trade regulation.

This being the case, the policy objective of building meaningful special and
differential treatment (SDT) provisions into the WTO agreements is of the
utmost importance.

You may be interested in the following synopsis of the paper by Christopher
Stevens of the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex and the on links
provided.

Best wishes

david legge




>    Breaking the WTO logjam: towards enforceable special and differential
>    treatment
>
>    Should developing countries adopt the same trade rules as developed
>    states - or should they be given Special and Differential Treatment
>    (SDT)? Are existing SDT mechanisms out of synchronisation with
>    emerging rules of trade policy? How can researchers assist the
>    incorporation of achievable SDT regimes within the World Trade
>    Organisation's (WTO) rule-making process?
>
>    A paper from the Institute of Development Studies makes the case that
>    consensus around SDTs must be reached if the current WTO negotiations
>    to remove barriers to trade (the Doha Round) is to move forward.
>    Warning against a rapid growth of country-specific mechanisms, it
>    calls on the WTO to rise to the challenge of applying agreed SDT rules
>    to broad groups of countries identified on the basis of objective
>    data.
>
>    SDT had its origins in a view of trade and development that questioned
>    the desirability of developing countries liberalising border measures
>    at the same pace as industrialised countries. Much of the `old SDT'
>    (particularly provisions relating to financial and technical
>    assistance or technology transfer) is unenforceable within the WTO
>    system and what is enforceable has often been overtaken by events.
>
>    The report notes that:
>
>    * By making dispute settlement binding, the Uruguay Round has removed
>    the inherent ambiguity in the vague texts of the WTO's predecessor
>    (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT) that were used by
>    developed and developing countries alike.
>
>    * This means that there must be more explicit provision to allow the
>    flexibility required by different countries' circumstances.
>
>    * Traditional SDT measures, such as extended implementation periods,
>    are inappropriate for some of the new rules that are agreed. Different
>    types of SDTs that relate to the specific problem are required.
>
>    * In some cases, such as patents and other Trade-Related Aspects of
>    Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the issue is whether or not it
>    is developmentally desirable for small, poor countries to adopt the
>    same rules as industrialised ones. What is required is not a longer
>    period to implement the common rules, but permanent exemption until it
>    is developmentally desirable to do so.
>
>    * In other cases, such as the WTO's very tentative steps to liberalise
>    world agricultural trade, the problem being addressed has largely been
>    created by rich country protectionism (such as that provided by the
>    EU's common agricultural policy). It is the rich countries that need
>    to have their misdeeds curtailed by new rules, not the poor ones.
>
>    The timetable for reviewing and systematising SDTs agreed by the WTO
>    in Doha in 2001 has slipped. Many developing countries are
>    understandably wary of agreeing yet more new rules with complex
>    effects when binding dispute settlement may result in unexpected
>    costs. The rich countries' reluctance to adhere to the Doha timetable
>    and make positive moves on SDT simply confirms these fears. Agreeing
>    to new rules that they do not yet fully understand and without an `SDT
>    safety net' would place them in a dilemma: while the implementation of
>    new rules may entail high administrative, financial or political
>    costs, non-implementation might leave them open to the threat of trade
>    sanctions by their trade partners following recourse to the WTO's
>    dispute settlement provisions.
>
>    Both developing states and the multilateral trade system would gain
>    from averting the current risk of a shift from multilateral to
>    bilateral/regional decision-making. The development of appropriate new
>    SDT to prevent the WTO rule-making process from seizing up - becoming
>    strongly advisable rather than legally enforceable - will require:
>
>    * acceptance within the WTO that while the one-size-fits-all approach
>    is flawed, the interests of each member are not so dissimilar that
>    they can only be dealt with through unique variations in their
>    national WTO schedules
>
>    * recognition that for the `new agenda' of intellectual property
>    rights and investment rules there is a dangerous lack of a research
>    base to identify the differential impact for groups of states
>
>    * more focused research to identify the shared interests of developing
>    countries and elaborate `do-able' SDT prior to the final stages of the
>    Doha Round
>
>    * identifying actionable modulations in the rules suited to the
>    characteristics of groups of countries with common features
>
>    * research to demonstrate the feasibility and country eligibility of
>    SDT in the `old areas' of trade policy - for example to create a
>    `Development Box' or a `Food Security Box' in the agriculture sections
>    of the WTO agreements.
>
>    Contributor(s): Christopher Stevens
>
>    Source(s):
>    More information: `The Future of Special and Differential Treatment
>    (SDT) for Developing Countries in the WTO', Working Paper 163,
>    Institute of Development Studies, September 2002
>    http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp163.pdf
>    `Special and Differential Treatment in terms of trade' IDS Bulletin
>    Vol 34, no 2, edited by Christopher Stevens, assisted by Jane Kennan,
>    April 2003
>
>    Funded by: DFID (SSRU R8007)
>
>    Date: 6 October 2003
>
>    Further Information:
>    Christopher Stevens
>    Institute of Development Studies
>    University of Sussex
>    Falmer
>    Brighton BN1 9RE
>    UK
>
>    Tel: 44 (0)1273 678790
>    Fax: +44 (0)1273 621202
>    Email: C.Stevens at ids.ac.uk
>
>    Institute of Development Studies (IDS), UK http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/
>
>    Other related links:
>
>    'Dumping: blocking the trade escape route from poverty?'
>    http://www.id21.org/society/s5cox1g1.html
>
>    'Level playing field? Making world trade work for all'
>    http://www.id21.org/society/S7bjw1g1.html
>
>    'Free market: at what cost? International trade and sustainable
>    development' http://www.id21.org/society/s7bnb2g1.html
>
>    'Trade for life: making trade work for poor people'
>    http://www.id21.org/society/s7bmc2g1.html
>
>    Christian Aid focuses on Trade
>    http://www.christian-aid.org/indepth/trade.htm
>
>    Refer to the UN Conference on Trade and Development
>    http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068
>
>    The World Bank aims to help countries to use Trade for development
>    http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade/
>
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>
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