PHA-Exchange> GLOBALink N&I - Legislation & Politics" <news.legipol at globalink.org> Subject: FCTC: NGOs Urge Nations of the World to Reject US Cowboy Diplomacy - Infact/NATT

[Syed Mahbubul Alam]

NGOs Urge Nations of the World to Reject Cowboy Diplomacy of US in Talks on 
First Public Health Treaty - Infact
New Infact Report Exposes US History of Undermining International, 
Environmental, Human Rights, Disarmament and Health Agreements
Wednesday, February 19, 2003
GENEVA--Three days into the final round of negotiations on the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), members of the Network for 
Accountability of Tobacco Transnationals (NATT) are urging nations to 
reject the cowboy diplomacy tactics of the US. The release of a new Infact 
report-Cowboy Diplomacy: How the US Undermines International Environmental, 
Human Rights, Disarmament and Health Agreements-is fueling the call. 
According to the report, there is a clear pattern in recent history of the 
US negotiating down to the lowest common denominator, then failing to 
support environmental, human rights and other treaties. Throughout the FCTC 
talks, the US has been sharply criticized for protecting the interests of 
tobacco giant Philip Morris at the expense of public health.
The release of Cowboy Diplomacy is intensifying pressure on the Bush 
administration regarding its position on the FCTC at a time when concerns 
about US unilateralism are particularly high. “The US has increasingly 
isolated itself from the global community on issues of enormous 
humanitarian and environmental consequence. In the face of tobacco’s 
staggering death toll, we are calling on the US to stop blocking progress 
on the FCTC,” says Kathryn Mulvey of Infact (US), a NATT member.
Cowboy Diplomacy examines the US role in the following international 
agreements: the Kyoto Protocol, Persistent Organic Pollutants Treaty, Basel 
Convention, Biosafety Protocol, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and Landmine Ban Treaty. 
Lessons drawn have strong implications for FCTC negotiators. The example of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child is particularly telling. Much of 
the Convention was built around the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
However, the US and Somalia are the only countries that remain outside that 
Convention.
While challenging the role of the US in the FCTC process, NATT members are 
also praising the leadership of the countries pushing for a strong FCTC in 
the face of intense pressure. On the opening day of this round of talks, 
cries rang out from every WHO region for a comprehensive ban on 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship, while the majority of those 
countries represented through interventions strongly prioritized health 
over trade.
“When the majority of countries are united, opposition from the US can be 
overcome. Too often when the US has succeeded in watering down treaties, it 
fails to ratify them anyway. It is far better to have a strong Convention 
without US participation than a weak agreement with the same end result. We 
are looking to African, Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern and Pacific Islands 
countries to lead the way,” says Muyunda Ililonga of Zambian Consumers 
Association, a NATT member.
NGOs are also warning FCTC negotiators to remain vigilant to the dirty 
tricks of tobacco transnationals. Internal tobacco industry documents, made 
public for the first time in an Infact paper released last week, reveal 
that Big Tobacco has targeted certain African and Latin American countries 
in its attempts to subvert the treaty. Under the terms of a 1998 settlement 
with the US State of Minnesota, tobacco corporations are required to 
disclose documents related to US tobacco litigation. This responsibility 
includes maintaining until 2008 a website, onto which new documents are 
uploaded regularly. Damning documents loaded within the last few months, 
including memos from as recently as 1999, expose new details of Philip 
Morris’s plan to thwart the FCTC.
“The tobacco giants will stop at nothing in their attempts to derail the 
FCTC. But Philip Morris, BAT, and Japan Tobacco have formidable opponents 
in the courageous leadership of many of the countries negotiating this 
treaty. The next ten days are decisive. We will be monitoring the talks 
closely, and are hopeful for a treaty that lives up to its promise,” says 
Akinbode Oluwafemi of Environmental Rights Action (Nigeria), a NATT member.
Since 1977, Infact has been exposing life-threatening abuses of 
transnational corporations and organizing successful grassroots campaigns 
to hold corporations accountable to consumers and society at large. Infact 
is an NGO in Official Relations with the World Health Organization (WHO). 
The Network for Accountability of Tobacco Transnationals (NATT) includes 75 
NGOs from more than 50 countries working for a strong, enforceable 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. NATT members at INB6 include: 
Center for Alternative Development Initiatives (Philippines), Consumers 
Association of Malawi, ConsumerVOICE (India), Environmental Rights Action 
(Nigeria), Infact (US), National Council Against Smoking (South Africa), 
Sindicato Medico del Uruguay, and Zambian Consumers Association.
http://www.infact.org/021903cd.html

COWBOY DIPLOMACY: How the US Undermines International Environmental, Human 
Rights, Disarmament and Health Agreements - Infact
Wednesday, February 19, 2003
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Environmental Treaties
Kyoto Protocol
Persistent Organic Pollutants Treaty
Basel Convention
Biosafety Protocol
Human Rights
Convention on the Rights of the Child/Child Soldiers Protocol
Peace and Disarmament Treaties
Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention
The Landmine Ban Treaty
Implications for the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Infact Publications and Resources
Recommended Resources
Treaty Process in the US
Endnotes
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Implications for the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
There is a clear pattern in recent history of the US negotiating down to 
the lowest common denominator, then failing to support environmental, human 
rights and other treaties. This pattern has already begun to undermine 
trust that the US enters negotiations in good faith, and leaves US NGOs in 
the uncomfortable position of urging the rest of the world to move forward 
without expecting much in the way of our own government's participation.
One of George W. Bush's closest allies, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
announced in January 2003 that if President Bush wants support on US 
policies, the US has to support agreements that the rest of the world wants 
like climate change.97
Implications for FCTC Negotiators: NGOs who have worked on other treaties 
uniformly urge negotiators of the FCTC not to weaken that treaty in an 
effort to appease the US. Peter Herby of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross observes that in treaty negotiations, "A lot depends on 
individuals and countries having the political will and the degree of risk 
politicians are willing to take. Agreements that don’t achieve anything are 
damaging to people’s confidence in multilateralism and international 
cooperation."98
We have seen that when the majority of countries are united, opposition 
from the US can be overcome. Appeasement doesn't work. Too often when the 
US has succeeded in watering down treaties, they fail to ratify them 
anyway, so better to have a strong Convention without US participation than 
a weak agreement with the same end result.
The consensus process does not mean giving veto power to a global bully. 
The general sense among US-based NGOs is that there is very little 
likelihood that the current administration will support the FCTC, and 
statements about wanting to sign the treaty are hollow. "In the case of the 
Landmine Ban Treaty, dozens of small and medium-sized governments decided 
to set the highest possible standard against this indiscriminate weapon. 
Rather than negotiating a treaty by consensus that could be improved over 
years to come, within a very short period of time they achieved their goal 
by establishing a clear and unequivocal loophole-free ban that governments 
could join without exception or reservation. The FCTC should seek to set a 
similar standard against tobacco. Any compromise or weakening of the 
standard against tobacco would result in the unnecessary loss of thousands 
of lives to this deadly product which, like landmines, represent an urgent 
public health threat. The negotiators should respond strongly and quickly 
to this public health emergency by producing a treaty that sets the highest 
possible standards," said Mary Wareham, Senior Advocate, Arms Division for 
Human Rights Watch.99
The FCTC can still be effective without US participation. The bulk of the 
impact of the tobacco epidemic in the future will be in developing 
countries, not the US. The positions of the US on international tobacco 
control policy are out of sync with domestic policy where weak positions on 
tobacco control would not be tolerated. Why should the international 
community tolerate them? If the treaty is weak it will not be effective in 
controlling the tobacco transnationals. A low bar for the treaty will make 
it difficult for policymakers to make a case that stronger domestic laws 
are needed to protect public health, and the tobacco corporations will 
exploit loopholes on issues like advertising. We should strive for the 
highest, not the lowest standard. If the treaty contains strong provisions 
it will impact the activities of the tobacco transnationals with or without 
US participation—the focus is where the future of Philip Morris, British 
American Tobacco and Japan Tobacco lies.
The implications of the FCTC extend far beyond tobacco. While global 
mechanisms and institutions to govern trade have developed at a rapid pace, 
global measures to protect health, the environment and human rights lag far 
behind. The public health and NGO communities together with governments 
should demand that the FCTC set a worthy precedent by explicitly 
subordinating commercial interests to health concerns. Now is the time for 
governments and NGOs to let the world know we will not tolerate an FCTC the 
tobacco transnationals can live with—and, if necessary, to fight the 
adoption of an FCTC that will do more harm than good.
A Message for the US Public: The unilateral actions of the US are a threat 
to international law and cooperation, to the environment, to human rights 
and to public health and safety. The damage doesn't end with the US image 
of Cowboy Diplomacy. If the US expects international support on issues of 
importance to its interests, the US must be willing to be a leader on 
issues of international humanitarian significance.
Recent political statements espoused by some conservative elements—that US 
international obligations should go no further than its domestic 
obligations—are dangerous. "In viewing treaty compliance as a matter of 
political convenience rather than as a legal obligation, the United States 
is forsaking its own best traditions, which were to create the very best 
ideas of the rule of law and equality before the law. This US approach is 
not only setting a poor example, it is also increasing security and 
environmental dangers in the world," said Arjun Makhiijani, President of 
the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. The whole point is 
that treaties are necessary to solve international issues that go beyond 
national law, and this concept has been widely accepted by the 
international community and codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in 1969.100
A common remark heard from governments and international NGOs during FCTC 
negotiations is, "It's always the US we are fighting." The US is the main 
obstacle to progress in preventing millions of deaths from tobacco—the 
world's largest threat to public health. We should be ashamed. But more 
than feeling shame, we must channel our outrage to make it politically 
untenable for the US not to support effective environmental, human rights, 
disarmament and public health treaties. The US government's positions on 
these issues are out of step with US public opinion. The US public must 
find its voice and not be silent.
http://www.infact.org/cowboyd.html

Treaty Trespassers:
NEW EVIDENCE OF ESCALATING TOBACCO INDUSTRY ACTIVITY TO DERAIL
THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL - Infact
FEBRUARY 2003
Since 1977, Infact has been exposing life-threatening abuses of 
transnational corporations and organizing successful grassroots campaigns 
to hold corporations accountable to consumers and society at large. Infact 
is an NGO in Official Relations with the World Health Organization (WHO).
The Network for Accountability of Tobacco Transnationals (NATT) includes 75 
NGOs from 50 countries working for a strong, enforceable Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control.
INTRODUCTION
In the final stages of drafting the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), transnational tobacco corporations are escalating their efforts to 
undermine the treaty. Recently released tobacco industry internal 
documents—made public for the first time in this paper1—reveal that Big 
Tobacco has targeted certain African and Latin American countries in its 
attempts to subvert the treaty. With the aid of notorious PR firms, 
powerful trade associations, and close allies in top-level government 
positions, Philip Morris, British American Tobacco (BAT), and Japan Tobacco 
International are coordinating a formidable challenge to the world’s first 
public health treaty.
This report examines the presence of the three largest tobacco 
transnationals at the fifth round of FCTC negotiations (INB5) in October 
2002—using evidence gathered from internal corporate documents, news 
reports, and by representatives of Infact and other NATT members. The final 
round of negotiations will determine whether governments seeking to protect 
global public heath over the profits of the tobacco industry manage to 
overcome the efforts of the tobacco transnationals. Infact and NATT will 
continue to investigate and expose tobacco industry interference in the FCTC.
TOBACCO INDUSTRY GROUNDWORK
New Evidence Reveals Extent of PR Firm
Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin’s Duplicity
According to Philip Morris internal documents, the corporation has enlisted 
Jack Mongoven of the notorious corporate spy firm Mongoven, Biscoe and 
Duchin (MBD) to advise the tobacco giant on how to thwart the FCTC. In 
1999, Philip Morris commissioned Mongoven to investigate a variety of areas 
in which the tobacco giant could influence the FCTC. According to a 
recently released memo chronicling MBD’s plan, Mongoven was to identify 
"priority countries at the WHO and key ministries/names," provide "analysis 
of prior conventions to identify generic concerns about conventions," and 
prepare "a draft youth smoking prevention protocol."2
In the same document, Philip Morris states its intention to identify 
sympathetic government allies: "our plan will lack teeth until we know 
those markets where we can participate in the development of government 
policy viz (sic) the convention." Philip Morris acknowledges that once the 
idea of a Convention is adopted it "will be able to discuss views on the 
Convention in principle and at the national level in those markets where we 
have access to government decision makers."3
MBD has a long relationship with the tobacco industry, and in 1997 advised 
Philip Morris "if it could not delay the adoption of the convention it 
should instigate a coordinated strategy to make it as weak as possible."4 
According to an analysis by Stacy Carter of the Department of Public Health 
at the University of Sydney in Australia, "WHO’s system of regions is also 
a potential weakness, because each contains at least one country which is 
weak on tobacco control and likely to support the interests of the industry 
and it may be this potential portal which MBD were exploiting."5 These 
internal documents clearly illustrate that the tobacco giant has been 
involved in a detailed plan to subvert the work of the WHO by exploiting 
the regional structure of the system.

Philip Morris Internal Documents Reveal Plan for Country Targeting
According to a Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs Action Plan 
that was posted on the corporation’s internal documents website last fall, 
in 1990 the tobacco giant devised its "Anti-tobacco Network, Question WHO 
Strategy on Tobacco" plan. Philip Morris’s strategy included identifying 
allies in Latin America and Africa while setting the following action steps:
·       Test WHO regional office support on WHO priorities in Latin America;
·       If WHO regional office strategy is successful in Latin America, 
apply in Africa, Philippines and India i.e. encouraging WHO to redirect its 
priorities to its original mandate;
·       Request GAO [US Government Accounting Office] to review US funding 
priorities of WHO;
·       Work with selected journalists to question WHO priorities, budget; and,
·       Assist smokers groups to join consumers organizations. 6
The more recent strategic work of MBD to figure out ways to influence 
international regulation builds on the corporation’s own internal planning 
established years prior.

BAT Documents Illustrate Coordinated Industry Effort
According to internal documents of BAT, it seems the second largest tobacco 
corporation was also looking to influence the WHO, especially in Latin 
America. A recent report released by the Pan American Health Organization 
describes the purpose of BAT’s Public Affairs Research Group (PARG): "to 
influence the vote of diplomatic delegations (sic) participation in the 
International Organizations at Geneva. So as to counteract proposition 
against the tobacco industry, specifically the ones proposed at OMS (WHO) 
General Assembly." In the same document the corporation notes that it is 
necessary for the industry to work together in order for this plan to 
thrive. "As in the past, for this initiative to be successful, it requires 
the participation of PMI and all BATCo. and BAT Industry (Souza Cruz 
[Brazil]) companies in the region."7 While Philip Morris and BAT fight for 
market share in this region, this document illustrates the industry’s 
desire to preempt meaningful regulation by the WHO, which prompted these 
two competing tobacco giants to cooperate.

GOVERNMENTS WITH TOBACCO INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION:
Big Tobacco’s Plan in Practice
Malawi
As internal corporate documents illustrate, Philip Morris long ago 
identified Africa as instrumental to the priorities of the world’s largest 
tobacco corporation. For this reason Philip Morris set its sights on 
Malawi, one of the largest producers of tobacco leaf in the world. 
According to the 1990 Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs Action 
Plan, the tobacco giant wanted to "approach allies in large tobacco growing 
countries to raise questions about WHO priorities eg. Latin America Tobacco 
Council, Minister of Health of Malawi."8
In Malawi, it seems that Philip Morris’s strategy has paid off as two 
representatives of tobacco industry trade associations served on the 
country’s delegation at INB5—the Chief Executive for the International 
Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) of Africa and the General Manager of the 
Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi.9
The ITGA Chief Executive for Africa, Mr. G. Thangathyanga is adamantly 
opposed to the FCTC or any efforts to reduce tobacco consumption. In 
response to the global convention he said, "Blocking access to 
international markets as advocated by the anti-tobacco lobby will kill 
thousands of people whose lives depend on the crop."10 While the farming of 
tobacco is a major source of revenue to Malawi, many studies have 
discredited this argument and instead have found the conversion to other 
crops would have a positive effect on tobacco dependent economies.11 In 
addition, Mr. Thangathyanga’s argument ignores the millions of people who 
die each year from tobacco related illnesses.
Another example of a Malawian delegate representing the tobacco industry’s 
interests is Mr. Mbale, the General Manager of the Tobacco Exporters 
Association (TEAM), a tobacco industry trade group. In 2000, when asked 
what the objectives and functions of his organization were, he replied "to 
represent the interests of the Tobacco Industry" and "To help co-ordinate 
activity to minimize the impact of Anti-smoking lobbyists."12
This is evidence that the action plan Philip Morris put into place in 1990 
has been effective in allowing the tobacco giant access through the 
governments of tobacco producing countries. Despite the targeting of Malawi 
by the world’s largest tobacco corporation, the African region has 
maintained the strongest positions being advocated by countries negotiating 
the FCTC.

Tobacco Industry Representation on Delegations of China, Turkey, Japan
Malawi is not the only country with FCTC delegates closely tied to the 
tobacco industry—many other countries also have tobacco industry 
representation at the negotiations. At INB5, China sent the Division 
Director and an Officer of its State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, and 
Turkey sent its Deputy Director-General of the State Monopoly on Tobacco 
and Beverages. Japan had five members of its Ministry of Finance—which owns 
a 67% stake in Japan Tobacco—on hand, with two of the individuals coming 
from the Tobacco and Salt Industries Office of the Ministry.13
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS PUSH AN INSIDIOUS AGENDA
Philip Morris also had many of its "friends" on hand at INB5. While some 
tobacco transnationals had highly visible delegations of top level 
representatives in Geneva, Philip Morris seems to have decided to take a 
more subtle, but no less insidious tack, and allow trade associations to do 
its dirty work.

International Tobacco Growers Association
In addition to having a place on the delegation of Malawi, the ITGA sent 
Antonio Ambrunhosa, the Chief Executive of ITGA worldwide, to attend INB5. 
The ITGA website states that the association is "the legitimate voice of 
millions of tobacco farmers all over the world. It was formed in 1984 to 
foster co-operation and information-sharing between its tobacco-growing 
members and contribute to the international debate on tobacco issues." Also 
on the organization’s website, the ITGA argues against the establishment of 
tobacco control policies because "there are many other health priorities 
well ahead of tobacco control."14 But according to the World Bank, tobacco 
control is an urgent priority because by 2030 tobacco will become the 
world’s leading cause of preventable death and 70% of all tobacco related 
deaths will occur in the developing world.15
Even though the tobacco association is an active participant in FCTC talks, 
in 2001 the ITGA "vowed to continue to fight outside the WHO system by 
lobbying governments and other United National (sic) and international 
organizations." In addition, in 2000 Mr. Ambrunhosa said, "Our experience 
with the WHO is that it is not interested in dialogue with tobacco growers, 
only in pursuing its economically destructive agenda."16 These statements 
clearly illustrate that the goals and ideals of the ITGA run counter to 
those of the WHO and the FCTC.

International Travel Retail Confederation
The International Travel Retail Confederation (ITRC) was established after 
the prohibition of duty-free sales in the European Union, and had 
previously been known as the International Duty Free Confederation. Keith 
Spinks, who formerly represented Rothmans Tobacco on the International Duty 
Free Coalition, is now the Director General of the ITRC. 17 After the most 
recent round of negotiations Spinks assessed the current situation by 
saying, "We must now enhance our efforts with governments to maintain the 
support of those countries opposed to the proposal to restrict or ban 
duty-free tobacco sales. We must also increase political activity with 
those countries that have not considered the issue fully but in many 
instances, have merely allowed their health ministries and tobacco 
activists to make policy decisions without considering the implications and 
consequences." According to the ITRC website, Philip Morris Duty Free is a 
member of this organization.18

International Association of Airport Duty Free Stores
The International Association of Airport Duty Free Stores (IAADFS) had a 
number of representatives in attendance at INB5. Thierry Lebeaux, who is 
the head of the EU office for Citigate Public Affairs and has represented 
the IAADFS since 1999, told an Infact representative that his organization 
does not represent the tobacco industry. But according to the IAADFS 
website Philip Morris is both a member and supporter of the organization, 
sponsoring events along with Japan Tobacco in 2002.19
Another representative of the IAADFS in attendance at INB5, Jon Kent, held 
a strategy meeting with Philip Morris representatives in 1999. According to 
Philip Morris’s internal documents, Jon Kent and a Philip Morris 
representative met on July 15, 1999. A week later, the IAADFS drafted a 
letter to its membership regarding a Philip Morris proposal.20
The groups present at the negotiations seem to have been very aware of each 
other and may even have had a concerted strategy. For example, on October 
23, 2002, Keith Spinks of ITRC and Jon Kent of IAADFS presented a workshop 
together on the future of duty-free tobacco and were described as "the key 
drivers in the lobbying process." According to the ITRC website, the 
purpose of the gathering was to "update the trade on the latest 
developments in the industry’s campaign against the proposed global 
abolition of duty-free tobacco sales" and noted that the workshop was to be 
held the week prior to and the week of the negotiations.21

TOBACCO TRANSNATIONALS AT INB5: EXERTING INFLUENCE WITH

HIGH-PROFILE ATTENDANCE AND BACKROOM BARGAINS
BAT
Even though many tobacco industry allies were in attendance at INB5, 
representatives of the tobacco giants were also out in full force. The most 
brazen of the tobacco transnationals was BAT with at least 12 
representatives including the head of International Political Affairs, the 
Manager of International Regulatory Affairs and the Manager of its Legal 
Division. During the negotiations, BAT representatives were handing out its 
position paper on the FCTC, which states:
"
we believe that the need for an international response in the form of a 
detailed and binding multilateral convention is much more limited than 
stated in the Preamble of the FCTC. Observing the proceedings of the 
international negotiating body over the last two years strengthened our 
view that if there is to be a convention, it should for the majority of 
issues be limited to non-binding guidelines for national governments." 22
BAT’s main objective is to maintain the status quo through voluntary, 
non-binding regulations, which at best will do nothing to curb the tobacco 
epidemic and at worst will provide protection for the industry in the future.
In addition to making the views of BAT known through its position paper, 
these representatives of the tobacco giant were also eager to engage in 
discussions with members of NATT. For example, Akinbode Oluwafemi of 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA), a Nigerian NATT member, had a long 
conversation with Kehinde Johnson, the Corporate Affairs Director for BAT 
Nigeria. Johnson shared that the tobacco giant has done everything in its 
power to counter what it considers to be the most effective tobacco control 
group in Nigeria. Through the conversation BAT confirmed it had engaged in 
several tactics to block the media from reporting ERA activities. It has 
also embarked on an intensive collection of information on ERA and Oluwafemi.23

Japan Tobacco International
The government of Japan owns 67% of Japan Tobacco International, which 
gives the third largest tobacco corporation unparalleled access to 
governments and the FCTC negotiating process. Before INB5 began, news 
reports out of Japan projected that the country’s delegation would lodge 
opposition to tobacco consumption reductions because the ministry was 
obliged under national legislation to promote tobacco. >From the floor of 
the negotiations, Japan’s delegation criticized the FCTC’s stated purpose 
of reducing tobacco consumption. In addition to the five members of the 
Japanese delegation representing the Ministry of Finance—who were 
presumably looking to protect their investment—Japan Tobacco bolstered its 
presence with at least 12 corporate representatives.24
Philip Morris
Philip Morris played a more undercover role than the other tobacco 
transnationals at INB5. It made inroads through allies and trade 
associations, perhaps executing plans outlined in internal documents years 
prior. According to news reports at the end of the last round of 
negotiations, Philip Morris admittedly had representation there, including 
a member of its international management.25
Even though Philip Morris took a lower profile than the other tobacco 
transnationals, its influence was no less pervasive. Philip Morris may have 
decided it was not necessary to send many of its executives because it 
already has many friends within the Bush Administration helping to 
determine the US position on the FCTC. For example, Karl Rove is a senior 
advisor to the President and one of the most powerful voices on the Bush 
team. This relationship dates back to 1994 when Rove was instrumental in 
constructing Bush’s winning gubernatorial campaign. After the election, 
Rove continued to advise Bush, while continuing his previous career as a 
lobbyist and consultant for Philip Morris.26
In another example of Philip Morris’s access, Bush appointed Tommy Thompson 
as the Secretary of Health and Human Services—the cabinet department where 
the head of the US Delegation to the FCTC is employed. When Thompson was 
the governor of Wisconsin, he maintained an open door policy with Philip 
Morris, receiving $70,000 in campaign contributions. During that time, 
Thompson took trips to three continents paid for by Philip Morris and even 
owned stock in the tobacco giant.27
Finally, Dan Troy is the powerful lead counsel for the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). He came to this position a year ago after leaving a 
Washington, DC law firm where he had argued against FDA attempts to limit 
tobacco advertising. He is known as an industry-friendly expert on First 
Amendment law, having argued that there is not a difference between 
commercial speech and political speech, and therefore corporations should 
not be held to stricter requirements.28
BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE FCTC
Philip Morris’s close ties to the Bush Administration may be the reason for 
the close resemblance between its positions on the FCTC and the positions 
that the current administration is taking. In August 2001, US 
Representative Henry Waxman submitted a letter to the Bush Administration 
outlining the similarities between Philip Morris’s position and the 
positions taken by US negotiators at the previous round of treaty talks in 
April 2001. Waxman identified 11 places where Philip Morris wanted language 
removed from the draft text, and the US delegation advocated changes that 
bore a striking resemblance to the demands of Philip Morris 10 out of the 
11 times. The tobacco-friendly interventions made by the US continued at 
INB5 as the delegation said it could not agree that the tobacco industry 
should be held responsible for all the harm caused by its products.29

ENDNOTES
Under the terms of a 1998 settlement with the US State of Minnesota, 
tobacco corporations are required to disclose documents related to US 
tobacco litigation. This responsibility includes maintaining until 2008 a 
website, onto which new documents are uploaded regularly.
Email correspondence from Matt Winokur, "WHO follow-up," March 30, 1999, 
Philip Morris Document ID:2072268126.
Email correspondence from Matt Winokur, "WHO follow-up," March 30, 1999, 
Philip Morris document ID: 2072268126.
Jeremy Laurance, "Tobacco Company Attacked Over its Lobbying Tactics," The 
Independent (London), 19 March 2002.
Stacy Carter, "Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin: Destroying Tobacco Control 
Activism From the Inside," Tobacco Control, 11, Issue 2, March 2002.
"PMI Affairs Action Plan 1990," Philip Morris Document ID: 2084339680.
"Profits Over People," Pan American Health Organization, November 2002.
Dr. Judith Mackay and Dr. Michael Eriksen, The Tobacco Atlas, A World 
Health Organization Publication, 2002; "PMI Affairs Action Plan 1990," 
Philip Morris Document ID: 2084339680.
"List of Participants," The World Health Organization, A/FCFC/INB5/DIV/2 
Rev.1, October 21, 2002.
"Farmers Say No Economic Life Without Tobacco," All-Africa.com, August 13, 
2001.
Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control, A 
World Bank Publication, 1999.
"Prospects for Malawi’s Tobacco Industry," Traders, Issue 2 April-July 
2000, Page 58.
"List of Participants," The World Health Organization, A/FCFC/INB5/DIV/2 
Rev.1, October 21, 2002.
ITGA Home Page, www.Tobaccoleaf.org, Document retrieved: January 8, 2003. 
"Commentary on World Health Organization Statements," www.Tobaccoleaf.org, 
Document retrieved: January 8, 2003.
Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control, A 
World Bank Publication, 1999.
"Tobacco Growers Condemn Underhand Tactics by the World Health 
Organization," www.tobaccoleaf.org/Media/011031_2.htm , October 31, 2001; 
"World Health Organization Leaves Farmers Out of Debate on Their Future 
once Again," ITGApress release, PR Newswire, March 13, 2000.
"ITRC Annual Report Calls for United Approach to Industry Changes," March 
2, 2001, www.travelretailworld.com; List of Delegates, ‘INFOTAB 
International Conference, Hong Kong 1989", Philip Morris document ID: 
2021594097.
"Conclusions From the Latest WHO Talks: ‘No Time for Complacency,’" October 
31, 2002, www.travelretailworld.com.
Personal communication by Infact with Thierry Lebeaux, Citigate Public 
Affairs, October 14, 2002; "Passport To your Global Village," 
www.iaadfs.org, June 2002, Vol. 12, No. 3.
Email correspondence from Robert Moore to Karen Chalkin, "IAADFS Meeting in 
Washington, DC (International Association of Airport Duty Free Stores)" 
July 6, 1999, Philip Morris Document ID: 2072356394; Mail Merge letter from 
the International Association of Airport Duty Free Stores, July 22, 1999, 
Philip Morris Document ID: 2072050948.
"Tobacco Workshop Planned for Cannes," September 30, 2002, 
Travelretailworld.com.
Personal accounts by Infact representatives to INB5, October 2002; "British 
American Tobacco’s Comments On the New Chair’s Text of a Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control," A/FCTC/INB5/2, August 2002.
Personal communication by Environmental Rights Action with Kehinde Johnson, 
Corporate Affairs Director, BAT Nigeria October 2002.
Green, Shane, "Japan Seeks Extra Mild Treaty in Fear Over Ash and Cash," 
www.SMH.com.au, October 9, 2002; "Japan to Oppose Tobacco Consumption 
Cuts," Japan Today, October 8, 2002; Statement made by Japan during WHO 
Formal FCTC negotiations, October 16, 2002; Personal accounts by Infact 
representatives to INB5, October 2002.
Rachel Rivera, "Tobacco Control Treaty Moves Toward Global Ban on Cigarette 
Advertising," AFX Press, October 15, 2002.
Ed Vulliamy, "America in the Grip of Bush’s ‘Iron Triangle’," The Observer 
(UK), December 3, 2000.
"Industries that Backed Bush Are Now Seeking Return on Investment," The 
Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2001; David Pace, "Thompson Has Strong 
Tobacco Ties," Washington Post Online, January 10, 2001.
Michael Kranish, "FDA Counsel’s Rise Embodies US Shift," Boston Globe, 
December 22, 2002.
Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of US Congress to 
President Bush, November 19, 2001; Statement made by the US during formal 
FCTC negotiations, October 16, 2002.
http://www.infact.org/treatytr.html

=============================
Stan Shatenstein






--
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