PHA-Exchange> Fw: Commodifying rain

[Maria Hamlin Zuniga]

María Hamlin Zúniga
International People´s Health Council - IPHC
Apartado · 3267
Managua, Nicaragua

Telefax:  505-2662225
iphc at cablenet.com.ni
iphc at cisas.org.ni
----- Original Message -----
From: "Le Monde diplomatique" <english at monde-diplomatique.fr>
To: "Le Monde diplomatique" <english at monde-diplomatique.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 4:09 PM
Subject: Commodifying rain


>
>    Le Monde diplomatique
>
>    -----------------------------------------------------
>
>    May 2002
>
>                       GLOBAL MARKET IN WATER
>
>                         Commodifying rain
>      _______________________________________________________
>
>     People in Argentina and Bolivia have begun openly to defy
>      the two big French multi-national companies that control
>      their privatised water supplies. Charges have increased
>             enormously while the service has worsened.
>
>                   by our special correspondent FRANCK POUPEAU *
>      _______________________________________________________
>
>      Increasing criticism of market globalisation has not
>      prevented multinationals from controlling such essentials
>      as water, where there are vast potential profits. The
>      market is dominated by two big French multinationals,
>      Vivendi-Générale des eaux and Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux.
>      They now control nearly 40% of the world market, each
>      serving, and billing, more than 110m people, Vivendi in
>      100 countries, Lyonnaise in 130.
>
>      They owe their profits to the deregulation of trade and
>      the complicity of international institutions and national
>      governments. The market is all the more lucrative because
>      the water services in nearly 85% of the world's cities
>      are run by public or state companies.
>
>      The two French giants and their subsidiaries have been
>      signing highly remunerative privatisation contracts on
>      the water market for 15 years. The successes of
>      Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux in China, Malaysia, Italy,
>      Thailand, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Australia and the
>      United States cannot beat those of Générale des eaux (now
>      Vivendi), sometimes in association with Suez-Lyonnaise,
>      as in Buenos Aires in 1993. Over the last 10 years,
>      Vivendi has entered Germany (Leipzig, Berlin), the Czech
>      Republic (Pilsen), Korea (Daesan complex), the
>      Philippines (Manila) and Kazakhstan (Almaty). It is also
>      represented in the US by its subsidiaries Air and Water
>      Technologies and US Filter (1).
>
>      But the water multinationals have had setbacks. They have
>      been forced to withdraw from some South American
>      countries and to seek compensation from international
>      authorities. In Tucuman, Argentina, in 1997 the
>      population started a civil disobedience campaign against
>      a Vivendi subsidiary, refusing to pay their bills in
>      protest at deteriorating water quality and doubled
>      charges. Générale des eaux had acquired the province's
>      privatised water and sewerage concessions in 1993. But
>      its immediate increase in the price of those services
>      (averaging 104%) brought protests from the consumers.
>      "The first to organise themselves were the towns in the
>      interior, in the region of sugar cane production where
>      there was a long experience of struggle. At first, seven
>      small cities formed a committee and later established the
>      national association in defence of the consumers of
>      Tucuman" (2).
>
>      The provincial government then called for penalties on
>      the company after finding tap water contaminated. Faced
>      with the payment boycott, Générale des eaux first
>      threatened to cut off supplies. Then it tried to
>      renegotiate the contract before finally withdrawing and
>      refusing to fulfil its obligations. It brought an action
>      against the Tucuman consumers before the International
>      Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
>      which found in the province's favour. (The ICSID is part
>      of the World Bank.) Since then, a change in provincial
>      government has removed legal protection for the payment
>      boycott.
>
>      Mostly, water privatisation is criticised for the
>      ecological consequences of integrating local economies
>      into a unified market. That means not only that
>      production is geared to outside demands, but also that
>      natural resources are exploited more intensively. The
>      Canadian activist Maud Barlow has shown how "countries
>      are lowering corporate taxes and environmental
>      regulations to remain competitive. As a result,
>      governments are left with reduced fiscal capacity to
>      reclaim polluted waterways and build infrastructures to
>      protect water; they are also left with reduced regulatory
>      capacity to prevent further pollution" (3).
>
>      But the same governments are also involved in the current
>      drive for deregulation and are responsible for
>      negotiating contracts with international bodies like the
>      World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the World
>      Water Council. The WTO's Qatar meeting in November saw
>      more privatisation. Under the heading "trade and
>      environment", article 31 iii of the final agreement calls
>      for "the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of
>      tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and
>      services," including water. This makes any attempt to
>      control commercial exports of water illegal. And Article
>      32 seeks to prevent countries from using non-tariff
>      barriers such as environmental protection laws to
>      interfere with trade liberalisation.
>
>                     Social effects overlooked
>
>      Less attention has been paid to the social effects of
>      these guidelines than to the ecological problems. But
>      local loss of control over water charges goes hand in
>      hand with price increases that deny the poor access not
>      only to the water service but also to clear information
>      about minimum health standards.
>
>      Water privatisation in La Paz, Bolivia, is an example. In
>      Alto Lima, the oldest and poorest quarter of La Paz, in
>      February rain formed muddy streams that overflowed the
>      sewers and flooded the roadway. The unpaved streets are
>      rutted and potholed, piles of refuse testifying to the
>      absence of public cleaning; they have not been lit at
>      night since that service was also privatised. The most
>      basic services are now provided by an NGO. At the weekly
>      market, vendors huddle under blue tarpaulins, which
>      afford some protection to their stalls of food or
>      clothes.
>
>      Antonio has lived in Alto Lima since he was a child. It
>      is a working-class district nearly 4000m above sea level;
>      the richer folk live lower, at 3,200 m. Alto Lima
>      overlooks the rest of the capital, but it takes over an
>      hour to reach the city centre. That is why Antonio goes
>      to the centre so rarely: it is too far and too expensive.
>      Antonio cannot understand why water, which is flowing so
>      freely here, is no longer available for him to wash or
>      drink. Since the supply was taken over by the French
>      Aguas del Illimani consortium (which belongs to Lyonnaise
>      des eaux), its price has risen from 2 to 12 bolivianos
>      (Bs). Most of the population cannot afford that and have
>      replaced showers by communal washing facilities, for
>      which they also have to pay.
>
>      The private concession has seen a deterioration in
>      service as a result of cost-cutting job losses. The team
>      of 18 technicians who used to check nearly 80,000 water
>      meters in the northern district every month has been cut
>      in half and given other maintenance tasks. It is rare
>      that any house's consumption is recorded: they pay the
>      same bill regardless of the amount used.
>
>      The consortium had made improving the service and
>      extending the network the main points in its publicity
>      campaign. The reality is quite different. Lack of
>      maintenance is making interruptions in supply
>      increasingly common, and they take longer to be repaired.
>      Businesses sometimes have to resort to old wells.
>
>      While managers' wages have risen from 12,000 to 65,000Bs
>      a month, manual workers earn only 1,800Bs; and it now
>      costs about 1,100 Bs ($135) to be connected to the water
>      supply, compared with 730Bs (less than $90) spread over
>      five years before privatisation. "Water is now a luxury
>      in Alto Lima," according to a worker sacked by Aguas del
>      Illimani. A luxury he can no longer afford.
>
>      "The aim was to show that Lyonnaise des eaux is capable
>      of serving difficult areas," Aguas del Illimani's French
>      managing director, Arnaud Bazire, explained (4). The
>      result is unconvincing. "They used to talk about new
>      equipment, but all they did was paint the pipes white,"
>      according to a maintenance worker; he also said that dead
>      animals were being found in the pipes with increasing
>      frequency. In other countries, privatised companies have
>      been prosecuted for failing to meet minimum public health
>      standards. So far, Aguas del Illimani has only been
>      prosecuted for cutting off municipal authorities for
>      several weeks; that included all the schools. But in
>      general, the supply is cut with impunity. The second and
>      third sectors of Alto Lima have had no supply for several
>      months. In December 2000 Arnaud Bazire described the
>      population there as the worst customer and "the worst
>      consumers in the world" (5).
>
>      Denis Cravel, a water specialist at the Inter-American
>      Development Bank (IDB), agrees. "The population have bad
>      habits," because they believe "the service ought to be
>      free" whereas "water is a social good, but also an
>      economic one". Alvaro Larrea Alarcon, an engineer with
>      the National Regional Development Fund, says the
>      concession could be profitable if the population changed
>      its habits and consumed more. "The population has to be
>      taught that it must get used to paying water bills. They
>      grow up without water and use public facilities or the
>      river. They are used to not having water in the home.
>      It's a question of culture. They have to be taught to
>      take a bath, to water their plants, wash their cars."
>
>      He seems unaware that on the infertile plains of the
>      Altiplano almost everyone uses public transport and that
>      desertification is already affecting the Andean basin.
>
>      Why do the people put up with such lack of consideration?
>      Outside observers claim to admire such optimistic
>      patience among the poorest of the poor. Their condition
>      prevents them from planning for the future and laying the
>      foundations of organisation (6). More than that, there is
>      no one official for them to talk to, not only because of
>      the break up of public services, but also because of the
>      growing rift between the political elites and the rest of
>      the population.
>
>      Cochabamba in Bolivia is the only town where the local
>      people, together with peasants from the surrounding area,
>      have found the strength and resources to respond and
>      reverse the privatisation of the water supply (7). But
>      then the Aguas del Tunari group (controlled by the US
>      multinational Bechtel), which was trying to get a
>      foothold there, did not put as much energy into
>      communication as the French groups did.
>        ____________________________________________________
>
>      * Sociologist
>
>      (1) For more details see Roger Cans, La Ruée vers l'eau,
>      Paris, Folio, 2001, chapter 3; but also Point de vue du
>      Sud-Centre Tricontinental, L'eau, patrimoine commun de
>      l'humanité, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002.
>
>      (2) Norma Giarracca, "The Social Protest for Water in
>      Tucuman", Defend the Global Commons, February 2002.
>
>      (3) Maud Barlow, Blue Gold. The Global Water Crisis and
>      the Commodification of the World's Water Supply,
>      International Forum on Globalisation, San Francisco 1999.
>
>      (4) Roger Cans, op cit.
>
>      (5) El Diario, La Paz, 11 December 2000; Presencia, La
>      Paz, 4 June 1998.
>
>      (6) See Pierre Bourdieu, "Les sous-prolétaires
>      algériens", Interventions 1962-2001, Agone, Marseille,
>      2002.
>
>      (7) See Franck Poupeau, "La guerre de l'eau", Agone, No
>      26-27, 2002. The population's blockade of the town forced
>      the government to cancel the contract and the consortium
>      has been seeking $25m compensation from Bolivia since
>      December 2001.
>
>
>
>                                Translated by Malcolm Greenwood
>
>
>        ____________________________________________________
>
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>
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